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Abstract
In this paper I examine the relationship between emotions and practical rationality, arguing that 
emotions are incredibly useful in assisting us in making practical choices. However, this enthusiasm 
needs to be met with some caution as it not the case that every one of our emotions give us reasons 
we should be considering in order to make a rational choice, and there are times where if we did follow 
our hearts we would end up feeling ashamed or displeased with ourselves afterward. At the same time, 
we can feel guilty about a decision we made while purposefully ignoring our emotions when they tell 
us otherwise. It is ultimately those instances of reflexive shame or displeasure that tell us something 
about our agency. Our reflexive emotions show us what we should really care about and when we are 
failing to do so. And, since the purpose of making rational decisions is to properly attend to our goals 
and aspirations, part of being rational is to purse what we care about. Our reflexive emotions act as a 
guide to how well or how poorly we are doing just that.  
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In recent years research concerning emotions and rationality has revealed that our 
abilities to reason and deliberate are not as opposed to our emotions as was once 
thought.1 Because our emotions are evaluations about the world rather than base-
less feelings, they are subject to correctness conditions and justification conditions. 
We ask for reasons as to why we experienced this or that emotion, so that emotions 
are not simply passive irrational or arational phenomena but rather one of the ways 
in which we examine and make sense of the world around us through our own eyes 
(Deonna & Teroni, 2012).2 We would never accuse someone of being irrational if they 
feared losing their job in itself because of how important it is to have a job in order to 
survive and be happy. However, we may tell the worker that their fear is misguided 
and false if their fear comes from being paranoid that their boss does not like them, 
when it turns out their boss likes them very much. Part of developing a more positive 
outlook on the relationship between emotions and rationality includes recent reflec-
tions on the role emotions play in our practical reasoning. In this paper I argue that 
our emotions can in fact positively contribute to our practical reasoning, but only a 
particular set of emotions actually assist us in making rational decisions. These are 
emotions that are authentic to ourselves as agents, and I posit that the only way to 
reliably tell if an emotional experience is authentically ours is through our reflexive 
emotions.
As our emotions are thought to give us privileged access to values as we examine the 
world, they make salient important reasons for our making one choice over another 
given what we care about. It is then argued that it is not at all irrational if we become 
emotional while deliberating over what to do, because of the special access to impor-
tant reason-giving considerations that our emotions provide to us. These sometimes 
contradict even our most reasoned judgements (Arpaly, 2002; Jones, 2004). If we take 
a worker who becomes fearful of losing their job as an example, their fear is really 
that of losing the income and insurance that the job provides in order to continue 
to take care of themselves and their family. They value the health and happiness of 
their family and themselves, and the job provides a way for the worker to satisfy what 
they care about. Thus, when the worker deliberates over what they should do, they 
are almost pulled towards picking up weekend shifts and staying late on weekdays. 
What matters for practical rationality is the rationality of the emotional agent’s ac-
tions, rather than the internal rationality of the agent’s emotions. The worker as an 
1  The amount of literature on this topic is immense and it would be impossible for me to list all 
relevant articles. See especially Damasio, 1994; de Sousa, 1987; Elster, 1999; Greenspan, 2000; Zhu & 
Thagard, 2002.
2  See chapters 8, 9, and 10.
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agent is rational insofar as they make decisions and act towards achieving the goals 
they have set for themselves, often based on what they value. The worker’s emotions 
are closely related to their goal of maintaining employment, due to both sharing the 
same value of familial love (Copp, 2005). So, although the emotion the worker is ex-
periencing is inappropriate and therefore irrational, it nevertheless plays a part in 
rational thought and action. Even though the worker incorrectly fears that their job 
is in danger, nothing about their actions of staying late and working weekends de-
creases their job security. If anything, those actions increase job security. Any action 
the worker can take in order for them to keep their job is rational in light of the goals 
and values that the worker has, even though the motivation behind those actions 
is an irrational emotion and false belief. The worker’s emotions are also authenti-
cally theirs, because their emotions fall in line with what they value and how they see 
themselves as an agent. There is no incoherency if the worker stands by their emo-
tions and emotionally motivated actions even after learning that they were mistaken. 
Still, we should have reservations with putting such an unwavering trust in our emo-
tional experiences being indicative of our values, and that they present reasons to us 
that will lead to rational decision-making. There is a danger in taking the case of the 
worker too far and passively accepting all of our emotions as giving reasons that we 
should accept and take on in our reasoning, as not all emotions represent our per-
sonal values. The emotion-personal value relationship is much tougher to suss out 
in the first person standpoint. Oftentimes our emotional experiences are not black 
and white and we are left to figure ourselves out. Epistemological conflicts involving 
emotional self-knowledge, including phenomena such as emotions that directly con-
tradict our most reasoned judgments, or emotions that reflect a character that seems 
to contradict the values we have committed ourselves to, are central to our possible 
self-deception about the emotion-personal value link. Even when our emotional ex-
periences are actually indicative of our values, we may not even know ourselves that 
it is the case (Damm, 2011). The already tenuous link between our emotions and our 
values, including whether we can know when it is the case that they are linked, pres-
ents an important dilemma for practical rationality: if we are rational in pursing what 
we value, can we really trust that our emotions give us reasons to act or decide as 
reasons for us? 
There are times when we react emotionally to a situation that surprises even our-
selves. If it were always the case that our emotions presented our values to us in one 
way or another, what are we to do if the emotion’s evaluation contradicts the kind of 
agent we take ourselves to be? I see this as a conflict between the narrative self and 
the “emotional self”. The narrative self is indeed telling a story of person we think we 
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are, and also the person we think we ought to be. The values that we see ourselves as 
committed to upholding are part of the narrative self. The emotional self is our actual 
emotional reactions as we experience them. The story of who we want to be may not 
be entirely accurate at the time we tell it if our emotional self seems to represent an 
entirely different set of values than the values presented by the narrative self. I am 
suggesting that while we cannot be deceived about the sort of values we want to 
have, we may certainly be deceived about the values we currently have, when it is 
the case that our emotions reflect values that we subconsciously hold due to how we 
were brought up. Part of becoming authentic is integrating the emotional self with 
the narrative self.
Only by achieving emotional authenticity will our emotions present reasons that we 
should accept. By becoming emotionally authentic we achieve a sense of autonomy, 
because to be autonomous is to act and decide in a way that tracks to what we care 
about in one way or another (Furrow & Wheeler, 2013). What we value in general is in-
tegral to our authenticity and autonomous agency because our valuations emphati-
cally present to us objects in the world we care about: things, people, and situations 
which have import to us when our goals are set (Helm, 2009). They are what matters 
to us as agents. To identify with a value to see oneself as committed to that value, tak-
ing the opportunity when it is appropriate to exemplify that value. Our autonomous 
agency is at least partly constitutive of the values we have because we get to choose 
the values we want to commit ourselves to. Some theories of agency that take values 
and cares into consideration fail to capture the intimate link between what we care 
about and our emotions, and so they also do not account for how we could possibly 
be motivated by our values and how an agent can still be wholly rational even if their 
emotions are irrational.3 
Jane values her relationship with her daughter, so she keeps her daughter in mind 
when she makes decisions about what to do with her days. When most people think 
of Jane they have difficulty doing so without seeing her daughter by her side. Harry 
values the quality of his home, so he spends a lot of time meticulously caring for 
of the upkeep his furniture, garden, and overall look of the house. Therefore when 
Harry experiences anxiety about a buildup of hair on his treasured couch, it leads him 
to spend time cleaning it up even after a long day at work. He deliberates and thinks 
that if he does go ahead with cleaning the couch he will be tired at work tomorrow, 
and that it would be perhaps best for him to get some rest. Yet he is pulled towards 
cleaning and cleans his couch anyway. While Jane’s daughter is away at school, 
3  See especially Bratman, 2007 esp. ch 8 and Frankfurt 2004.
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Jane laments not having seen her friends in a while and decides to make plans to 
see them. However, later that evening, after her daughter is home from school, Jane 
is just about to step out of the door when her daughter begins crying. Seeing her 
daughter in tears, Jane finds herself utterly unable to leave the house. Despite Jane’s 
acknowledgment that her daughter will calm down in a bit and that her husband 
would pay plenty of attention to their daughter while Jane is out, Jane just cannot 
pull herself away. Perhaps she anticipates the guilt she would feel if she really did 
leave the house. In both cases, what is valued takes precedence over other consider-
ations (including other values, but perhaps less important ones), and our emotions 
lead us to reasons for acting on these values in ways that certainly seem to trump the 
reasons we reach through contemplating the situation. In fact, both succeed in being 
rational for the same reason as the worker before them. The difference being that in 
the worker’s case his deliberation and emotion lead to the same action.  
Emotional authenticity secures a formal coherence between our self-conception, val-
ues, and emotions in a particular place and in a particular time. In order to preserve 
the self-governance and autonomy that emotional authenticity provides us, a flex-
ible view of authenticity is needed to capture our valuations that change over time. 
If we are to remain emotionally authentic through time we must have some room 
in this view of authenticity for self-guided change (Betzler, 2009). When we experi-
ence an emotion that challenges our identity as agents, we experience an emotion 
that seems to be alien to ourselves. Inauthenticity then occurs as we experience alien 
emotions we do not identify with. However, if we were to distance ourselves from 
emotions that seem alien to us as if they were not a part of us -especially alien emo-
tions that bring us a sense of deep shame or humiliation- we would close ourselves 
off from opportunities to change as people. These seemingly alien emotions must be 
a part of us, in one way or another, so we can see ourselves as at stake, and change 
ourselves (Helm, 1996). 
Reflexive emotions allow us to look at ourselves critically and put ourselves in a brand 
new light that we did not consider before, offering a sort of mechanism for checking 
how close we are to exemplifying the values we want to exemplify. Reflexive emo-
tions are then the only emotions that can tell us distinctly about ourselves, because 
reflexive emotions are emotions about ourselves. Just like before, our emotions are 
still evaluative, only now we are evaluating ourselves instead of the outside world 
(Teroni, 2016). If after the fact I think about the reaction of anger and am met with a 
deep sense of shame, then it seems that I do not think of my anger as authentic to 
who I am based on the values I have committed myself to. So, I failed to be authenti-
cally myself when I reacted in anger to that particular situation. In acting inauthen-
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tically I would fail to act as a rational agent as well, for even if my anger helped me 
achieve my goals in one way or another it would be a stroke of luck rather than actu-
ally helping me pursue what I care about. I was misguided to take this anger as giving 
reasons for me. A positive reflexive emotion can serve to build confidence, working to 
reinforce a previous experience. If the worker, Harry, or Jane felt pride after following 
through with their emotionally guided action then they would certainly think they 
made the right decision. This approach allows a weaker requirement of emotional 
self-knowledge as well. In reflecting on a previous experience, I need not have the 
answer to that question for it has no bearing on emotional authenticity. In instances 
where I cannot be entirely sure why I became as angry as I did, I can still tell if the 
response is congruent with who I am as an agent based the quality of my reflexive 
emotion. 
Consider the case of Julian. Julian envisions himself as a passionate advocate for 
disability rights. He sees it as central to his identity. He protests, goes on marches, 
writes speeches, and even stands on street corners handing out leaflets. Anyone who 
had only known Julian briefly would not have much cause to disagree with Julian 
when he says that he is a disability advocate. One day, when getting on the bus, he 
spots a small area to stand in and begins to walk towards the space. Before he can 
get there, an individual in a wheelchair takes the spot Julian wanted to stand in. Ju-
lian becomes angry. He wanted to stand there and now not only did he not achieve 
what he desired, but he has to stand in a spot on the bus where he stands shoulder to 
shoulder with others. He feels downright enraged at the person who forced him into 
this misery.  
After calming down a bit Julian feels a twinge of guilt. He realizes he got angry at one 
of the very people he is supposed to support. His general sympathy for the disabled 
conflicts with a genuine instance of anger that seems to be targeted at the disabled 
person. How can Julian’s anger possibly be authentically his based on what he val-
ues? The message of disability rights advocates is that we should think of those who 
are disabled no differently than those who are able bodied, and that we are all equal 
in spirit. Perhaps in this way Julian does not need to disassociate his emotion from 
himself despite his guilt, because he would have reacted in the same way regardless 
of how able-bodied the person was who stood in the spot. Julian’s anger was about 
having the spot stolen, and it just so happened that a disabled person took the spot. 
By realizing this, his guilt may change targets; he instead realizes that he might have 
some anger problems in general. Importantly, Julian may not be able to resolve this 
conflict in that way if he is unable to work that out for himself. Reflexive emotions 
allow us some slack in our emotional self-knowledge as the motivational role of emo-
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tions do enough for us to change the way we react to situations. The next time Julian 
gets on the bus and is met with a similar situation he may remember the guilt he felt 
from last time even if the target of his emotion ends up being an able-bodied person.
The dilemma Huckleberry Finn faces when he is trying to decide whether or not he 
should turn Jim in to the slave hunters presents us with a different challenge.4 Huck 
feels torn between the sympathy and love he has found for Jim as a friend and the 
moral values instilled in him by society. The reason Huck’s inner conflict is so difficult 
to solve for him from his own point of view is because he has not committed himself 
to upholding either of the two values he finds himself torn between. He obviously 
sees both the values instilled in him by society and the values that brought him his 
friendship with Jim as having import to him because he has emotional reactions in 
both directions. He feels anger when Jim talks about stealing back his wife and kids if 
he has to, but he also lies to the slave hunters because of the value that Jim’s friend-
ship has for Huck. On the boat after Huck lies to save Jim he admits that he would 
have felt a sense of guilt no matter what he chose, which is important because it 
shows that Huck has put himself at stake and sees the act of hiding Jim as his act. But 
instead of spurring change, the guilt causes him to give up morality altogether. Why?
While it is clear that his emotions reveal to him reasons to consider in his decision 
making processes (both in turning in Jim and giving up morality) which would not 
have come to him through thinking about it alone, Huck could not take any of those 
reasons to be relevant to himself as an agent. In Huck’s state on the boat after hiding 
Jim, it would be difficult to see why he should take any of the reasons he was con-
sidering as reasons for him to identify with. Huck gives up morality because he could 
not see that he actually has a choice in what values he wants to commit himself to 
identifying with. Relying on reflexive emotions would do nothing for him because 
he does not even have a true sense of self yet. While he feels guilty, he has no way of 
really discerning why; after all he acknowledges that he would feel guilty regardless. 
Perhaps it is because of his young age that he thinks he cannot do anything about 
it, that he lacks the critical reflection skills to question the morality of society. Nev-
ertheless, Huck’s story should illustrate how central it is for one to have values that 
they autonomously chose to commit themselves to. In the each of the cases I have 
presented above, the agents already had particular values they were committed to, 
so their reflexive emotions always had a purpose. Without that sense of purpose and 
unity, our emotions would indeed feel disruptive and irrational, and we would end 
up in a nihilistic state where the self is never quite in reach to begin with. Even the 
4  I am relying here on the discussion in Bennett, 1974.
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most basic theories of agency that rely on authorship and reflective endorsement 
would agree that the most basic building block of agency is to choose values which 
we are committed to caring about. 
It does us no good if the emotions claimed to focus our attention towards relevant 
reasons for us are in fact detrimental to our goals, self-worth, or anything else we val-
ue. In that way, we can hardly say that those reasons are actually reasons we should 
take up in deliberation. This moves us one step past Huckleberry Finn by actually 
starting with values one has committed themselves to like with Julian, Harry, Jane, 
and the worker. Emotional authenticity presents a bridge over the gaps between our 
emotions, personal values, and character. I believe that this takes the conversation 
in a positive direction as well since it presents a clear path towards self-integration 
and self-transformation. While we may not always be the people we hope to be, by 
taking ourselves seriously when we feel ashamed or angry with ourselves we have 
plenty of reasons to change. My anger towards myself when I become joyous for the 
wrong reasons, or my becoming sad or ashamed of myself because my anger led to a 
disastrous outcome pushes me from who I am in those moments of anger and joy to 
the kind of person I think I should be.5 By taking emotional transformation seriously 
in this way we act as rational agents. We can more easily pursue our values because 
we can use our reflexive emotions to tell when any emotionally guided action or de-
liberation has kept us rationally pursing our interests. We become more rational as 
agents the closer and closer we get to being completely emotionally authentic.
 
The hiker who has a phobia of heights may not be able to help that they are afraid 
of heights no matter what, but if it is the case that when they think about the lack of 
control they have over the crippling fear that keeps them from hiking, they become 
sad or angry instead of content or indifferent; the reflexive emotion shows that they 
value hiking and see it as part of their identity. It would then be irrational of them 
not to at least try to find ways to alleviate their phobia, even if they are unsuccess-
ful in doing so. Without that resounding emotional experience pushing one towards 
change, the supposed shift in character is very rightly open to censure as insincere 
and fake, as if putting on a mask. While it is not always the case that our emotions are 
representative of our personal values (especially phobias), reflexive emotions are. 
They guide us in being more authentic, and they help us realize in a distinct and par-
ticular way when we are not quite yet the type of person we want to be.
5  Becoming emotional for the wrong reasons is an epistemic issue regarding the justification and 
appropriateness of our emotions and is not the same as becoming emotional for what are morally 
bad reasons. On this distinction see D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000.
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Taking a step back and allowing ourselves to be a worthy target of shame, regret, 
frustration, and despair takes a lot of bravery. But we can never hope to change and 
to become better people if we are not vulnerable –not to others, but to ourselves. If 
we wish to become the type of people who will sincerely and passionately stand by 
what we care about instead of simply feeling some inner obligation to do so, we need 
to have the courage to admit to ourselves that we have a part to play if we feel guilty 
and ashamed of who we are. But something beautiful occurs if we allow ourselves to 
be so vulnerable: we can change. We can truly become sincerely and authentically 
ourselves and by doing so allow our emotions to ground our practical rationality.
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